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Aging nations and the future of cities 
 
Abstract 
We investigate whether an aging population may challenge the supremacy of large working-
cities. To this end, we develop an economic geography model with two types of individuals 
(the elderly and workers) and two sectors (consumer services and manufacturing). Individuals 
are geographically mobile and their agglomeration within a city generates rising urban costs 
through competition for land. When the elderly are immobile and equally distributed between 
cities, an aging population works against the agglomeration of production. When the elderly 
are free to choose their residence, the most likely scenario is such that the city with the lower 
share of old people follows a U-shaped curve. Increasing commuting costs cut short the first 
phase in which the employment share decreases. 
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Vieillissement de la population et avenir des villes 
 
Résumé 
Ce papier vise à déterminer si le vieillissement de la population peut remettre en cause la 
suprématie  des  grandes  villes.  Pour  cela  nous  développons  un  modèle  d’économie 
géographique avec deux types de personnes (des travailleurs et des retraités) et de secteurs 
(services aux consommateurs et industrie).  La  mobilité des travailleurs est  guidée par les 
écarts spatiaux de salaire, d’aménités et du coût de la vie tandis que les retraités sont sensibles 
uniquement aux écarts de coûts de la vie et d’aménités dans leurs choix de localisation. Nous 
montrons que la localisation des emplois ne va pas suivre la localisation des retraités même si 
la  proportion  dans  l’économie  de  ces  derniers  devient  élevée.  Les  coûts  urbains  agissent 
comme une forte force de dispersion empêchant une large fraction d’activités de s’implanter 
dans des villes accueillant beaucoup de personnes à la retraite. 
 
Mots-clefs : économie géographique, vieillissement de la population, mobilité géographique, 
mobilité sectorielle, coûts de déplacement des personnes 
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Aging nations and the future of cities
1 Introduction
Over the last decades, the weight of large cities in national economies has signiﬁcantly in-
creased. According to OECD (2006), the metropolitan areas of Brussels and Dublin account
for almost half of their national GDP, while London, Paris and Tokyo account for about one
third. Tokyo and New-York - the two richest cities in the world - have a higher GDP than
India. Out of the 25 wealthiest cities, as measured by their GDP per capita in PPPs, 22 are
set up in the United States while the others are in the European Union (London, Paris and
Dublin). The ranking by labor productivity is also dominated by the same American and
European cities. Recently, however, it has been argued that the supremacy of those large
working-cities could well be challenged by the growth of an aging population.
The population of the main industrialized countries is indeed forecasted to age substantially.
The old-age dependency ratio (the ratio people aged 65 and older to people aged 15 to 64)
is projected to double by 2050, meaning that the European Union will move from having
four persons of working age for every elderly citizen to only two (Carone and Costello, 2006).
This ratio is expected to be lower in the United States, with a rise from 19% to 32%,b u t
higher in Japan, with a rise from 25% in 2000 to 72% in 2050 (United Nations, 2003). Such
a demographic change is likely to have a strong impact on the urban system for at least two
reasons.
The elderly are driven by location factors that diﬀer from those governing workers’ residential
choices. Indeed, workers’ welfare depends on local services, land rent and wages, whereas reti-
rees’ welfare depends only upon on local services/amenities and land rent. As a consequence,
a pessimistic scenario consists of a projection in which the elderly will relocate into cities
endowed with natural and/or cultural amenities (Clark and Hunter, 1992). This in turn will
trigger the relocation of ﬁrms toward these cities. As long as large working-cities enjoy the
beneﬁts of substantial economies of agglomeration, this will aﬀect negatively their producti-
vity, thus threatening the national prosperity. According to Davezies (2008), the share of the
elderly is likely to reach a suﬃciently high value to jeopardize existing urban systems in most
developed countries. Such a scenario falls within a general debate on the future of cities.
In his “Return of the rentier city” published in the New York Times (October 5, 2007),
Krugman argued that 21st century metropolitan areas could well resemble 17th century cities.
The best description of old rentier cities is that provided by Cantillon (1755) in Chapter 5 of
his Essay on the Nature of Commerce. His starting point lies in the idea that “the landlords
who have several large estates have the means to go and live at a distance from them to enjoy
agreeable society with other landowners and gentlemen of the same condition.” Cantillon
went on by asserting that “[f]or the service of [...] noblemen, bakers, butchers, brewers, wine
merchants, manufacturers of all kinds, will be needed”. Consequently, “the assemblage of
several rich landowners living together in the same place suﬃces to form what is called a
city.” In such a context, the location choices made by the rentiers appear to be the main
engine of urban growth. The Wall Street Journal (October 5, 2007) echoes Cantillon when the
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journalists Cassell Bryan-Low and Jeanne Whalen speculate that foreign billionaires (Middle
Eastern sheiks, Russian businessmen, Indian industrialists) are behind the recent boom of
London. In other words, the location of jobs would follow the location of households whose
income does not come from labor. However, recent and detailed empirical evidence provided
by Chen and Rosenthal (2008) suggests that the American economy is not moving along
these lines, but instead toward a pattern of urban specialization involving both working- and
elderly-cities : “locations with improving consumer amenities become increasingly oriented
toward retirees relative to workers while locations with improving business environments
experience the opposite eﬀect”. Given such contradicting viewpoints, there is a need for
better theoretical foundations.
This paper aims at studying the impact of an aging population on the future of large cities.
The modern approach to city formation is based on the idea that the agglomeration of
activities in working-cities is triggered by a circular causation process à la Myrdal, which
involves two eﬀects that reinforce each other : (i) more workers in a city give rise to a
larger demand which, therefore, leads more ﬁrms to locate there in order to better exploit
scale economies; (ii) more ﬁrms in a city induce higher real wages, making this place more
attractive to workers (Krugman, 1991; Fujita et al.,1 9 9 9 ) .T h ec r u c i a lp o i n ti nt h i sa r g u m e n t
i st h ef a c tt h a ti n d i v i d u a l sa r eb o t hw o r k e r sa n dc o n s u m e r s .O n c ew ea c c o u n tf o rt h ep r e s e n c e
of old people who do not work, the process of circular causation sparked by workers’ location
choice could well be challenged when the share of old people reaches suﬃciently high values.
We show that such extreme predictions are not warranted. On the contrary, the trend un-
covered by Chen and Rosenthal (2008) appears to be the most likely scenario. To reach our
goal, we develop a setting that borrows ingredients from urban economics and economic geo-
graphy, which allows us to study how the residential choices made by retirees may impact
on the between- and within-city distribution of jobs. Speciﬁcally, our framework takes into
account four main features of modern economies that are overlooked in economic geography.
(i) We recognize the fact that individuals become more geographically and professionally
mobile, while industries are almost free from immobile production factors. (ii) We concur
with Glaeser and Kohlhase (2004) and assume that the cost of trading commodities across
developed nations is negligible. (iii) In such countries, housing and commuting costs, which
we call urban costs, account for more than one-third and sometimes as much as one-half of
households’ budgets (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2003; Winqvist, 1999). Bringing (ii) and
(iii) together leads us to replace the standard thought experiment of economic geography,
i.e. the impact of falling trade costs for commodities on the distribution of economic activity,
by the impact of an aging population on this distribution. (iv) We introduce local b2c ser-
vices that are diﬀerentiated and non-tradeable (Daniels, 1993). Despite strong decreases in
transport and communication costs, many b2c services are still supplied locally (e.g., health
care, restaurants and movie theaters). As observed by Glaeser et al. (2001), the success of a
city depends more than before on its role as a center of consumption, that is, on the supply
of local amenities and services. It is, therefore, critical to account for the way workers distri-
bute themselves between the manufacturing and service sectors once the elderly’s residential
choices are integrated into the picture, a feature that our model captures. Our setting is,
therefore, very diﬀerent from economic geography models à la Krugman. In particular, we
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consider two sectors having diﬀerent characteristics (manufacturing and local services) as
well as two types of consumers with diﬀerent tastes (workers and retirees).
Our setting encapsulates the following major trade-oﬀ. On the one hand, consumers’ resi-
dential choices depend on the location of diﬀerentiated local services, which builds a strong
link between retirees and workers. On the other hand, growing urban costs caused by the
agglomeration of individuals and the consumption of amenities by the elderly act as a force
pushing toward the separation of the diﬀerent types of consumers. That said, our main results
may be summarized as follows. We ﬁrst consider the benchmark case in which the elderly
are equally distributed between cities and show that an aging population works against the
agglomeration of manufacturing ﬁrms. This result supports the idea that an increasing share
of retirees in the economy challenges the supremacy of the working-cities. However, once
we allow for the elderly to choose their location, the story vastly changes. Indeed, the eco-
nomy now displays two stable equilibria that behave very diﬀerently : in the former one,
the mobility of the elderly does not jeopardize the existing urban hierarchy, whereas it does
in the latter one. This could explain why contradicting opinions regarding the evolution of
urban systems in aging nations coexist. However, we will see that the equilibrium in which
the working-city remains the primate city, the other city accommodating the larger share of
retirees, is the one that agrees with current empirical evidence.
In addition, our results show that the employment level in working-cities decreases because
the city accommodating the larger share of retirees is a growing outlet for service ﬁrms, which
makes this place more attractive to manufacturing workers. However, the gradual migration
of retirees toward cities endowed with more amenities raise the level of urban costs in these
cities and/or decrease their consumption of local services, thus making the working-cities
more attractive to manufacturing ﬁrms. Nevertheless, this need not be true for b2c services
because they beneﬁt from large outlets in the elderly-cities. Thus, cities tend to become
more divergent in their job and demographic structures. It is worth stressing, however, that
during the aging process the working-cities remain the larger ones. Hence, the return of pre-
industrial urban system à la Cantillon does not seem to be on the agenda. Quite the opposite :
the future of large working-cities is still bright, the reason being that today’s urban costs act
as a strong force preventing manufacturing ﬁrms as well as several service ﬁrms to follow
suite the rentiers in the elderly-cities, while the supply of diﬀerentiated b2c services prevent
their complete separation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the
model. In order to disentangle the diﬀerent eﬀects at work, we study in Section 3 the impact
of an aging nation on the location of activities in the special, but relevant, case of a uniform
distribution of old people. In Section 4, we allow for the endogenous determination of the
spatial distribution of the elderly and show how the residential choices made by the elderly
aﬀect the spatial organization of the economy. In the last section, we explain why our results
cast doubts on the possibility of a return of pre-industrial urban systems.
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2 The model
Consider an economy formed by a continuum of individuals whose number is L, by two cities
r = H,F, and by four goods.1 Since the average size of cities is arbitrary, our two-city setting
allows us to consider urban systems within small and large economies. The population is
split between two groups of consumers, i.e. the elderly and the workers whose shares are θ
and 1 − θ, respectively. Hence, the old-age dependency ratio is given by θ/(1 − θ).I ti sb o t h
relevant and convenient to distinguish between what we call a short-run equilibrium,i nw h i c h
workers and elderly are immobile, and a long-run equilibrium when these agents are mobile
across space.
The ﬁrst good is homogenous and available as an endowment denoted q0; it can be shipped
costlessly between the two cities and is chosen as the numéraire. The second and third goods
are diﬀerentiated and made available under the form of a continuum of varieties. The second
good stands for a composite of manufactured goods that are freely tradeable (trade costs are
zero), while the third good is a bundle of services locally produced and non-tradeable (trade
costs are prohibitive). Preferences are the same across individuals and a consumer’s utility
is given by :






















where qi(v) is the quantity of variety v of good i =1 ,2 and q0 the quantity of the numéraire.
All parameters αi, βi and γi are positive; γi > 0 measures the substitutability between
varieties of the i-good, whereas βi − γi > 0 expresses the intensity of love for variety.
In (1), N1 is the total number of good 1-varieties because this good is freely tradeable,
whereas N2 must be replaced by the number of good 2-varieties supplied in the city where
the consumer lives. Because consumers have a preference for variety, the second term in the
right-hand side of (1) is weighted by Ni/(N1 +N2) to capture the idea that a good supplied
under a small range of varieties has less impact on the consumer well-being than a good made
available as a large array of varieties.2 This speciﬁcation of individual preferences allows us
to capture various substitution eﬀects between manufactured goods and local services that
make the distributions of workers and retirees interdependent as well as the size and location
of the two sectors. In particular, we will see that an increase in the number of service ﬁrms
in city r leads to a higher local demand for the manufactured good.
The fourth good is land (or housing). In order to keep matters simple, we consider the case
of a one-dimensional and continuous space in which each location has a unit amount of land,
while the opportunity cost of land is normalized to zero. Each city has a central business
district (CBD) where manufacturing and service ﬁrms locate.3 The two CBDs are suﬃciently
1We discuss the extension of our setting to an arbitrary number of cities in Section 4.
2See Tabuchi and Thisse (2006) for further details.
3Duranton and Puga (2004) survey the main explanations for a CBD to exist. Introducing such conside-
rations into the model would make it much less tractable without gaining any important insight.
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far apart for the two cities to be distinct. As in standard urban economics, ﬁrms do not
consume land, whereas individuals consume land and commute to the local CBD where jobs
and goods are supplied. For simplicity, they consume a ﬁxed lot size normalized to one and
commuting costs are linear in distance. We assume that elderly’s unit commuting cost, given
by τ>0, exceeds workers’ unit commuting cost t>0 (τ>t ). Admittedly, this assumption
is debatable from the empirical point of view but it allows us to derive simple expressions,
whereas assuming t>τwould lead to cumbersome expressions that do not aﬀect the nature
of our main results. What matters for our argument is that urban costs increase with the
number of retirees.
Each variety of good i is supplied by a single ﬁrm producing under increasing returns so
that Ni is also the total number of ﬁrms operating in sector i.T h eﬁxed requirement of
labor needed to produce a good i-variety is denoted by φi > 0, while the corresponding
marginal requirement is set equal to zero for simpliﬁcation. Consequently, the number of
good 1-varieties available in the economy is proportional to the total number of individuals
working in the manufacturing sector, whereas the number of good 2-varieties available in a
city is proportional to the number of individuals living in this city and working in the service
sector. Let sir be the share of workers in sector i =1 ,2 and city r = H,F. The corresponding
labor market-clearing conditions imply
N1 =






where N2r the number of service ﬁrms located in city r,w i t hN2 = N2H + N2F.N o t et h a t
both N1 and N2r are linear functions of L.L e tsr = s1r +s2r be the share of workers and σr
the share of elderly people living in city r = H,F,w i t hs1H +s1F =1−θ and σH +σF = θ.
The population Lr residing in city r is then given by
Lr = sr(1 − θ)L + σrθL r = H,F (3)
with LH + LF = L.
At the land market equilibrium, individuals in city r are uniformly distributed over the inter-
val [−Lr/2,L r/2]. For notational simplicity, we focus on the right side of the city. Since the
elderly people have the higher commuting cost, they are located in the land strip [0,σrθL/2],
while workers live in (σrθL/2,σrθL/2+sr(1 − θ)L/2]. Furthermore, because each indivi-
dual consumes one unit of land, the equilibrium land rent paid by a retiree located at





















o(σrθL/2) = R∗(σrθL/2). Thus, both land rents are linear functions of L and are
shifted upward with the number of workers and retirees living city r.
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It remains to specify the property right on land as well as the elderly’ income. We close the
model by assuming that land is collectively owned by the elderly. The income of a retiree is,
therefore, given by the aggregate land rent ALR divided by the total number of elderly. It
thus varies with the distribution of activities as well as with the way the retirees distribute
themselves between the two cities.4
Since preferences and technologies are symmetric within each sector, ﬁrms sell their variety v
at the same price in each city. Furthermore, as shipping good 1 is costless, manufacturing ﬁrms
sell their output at the same price p1 regardless of their customers’ location. Consequently,
the budget constraint of a worker residing in city r and earning wage wir in sector i is given
by
N1p1q1r + N2rp2rq2r + t
sr(1 − θ)L + σrθL
2
+ q0 = q0 + wir
while the budget of an old person living in this city is






+ q0 = q0 +
ALR
θL
where p2r is the consumer price of a good 2-variety in city r and qir the individual consumption
of a good i-variety by an individual living in city r. The initial endowment q0 is supposed to
be suﬃciently large for the equilibrium consumption of the numéraire to be positive for each
i n d i v i d u a l .T h i sa s s u m p t i o ni sm a d et oc a p t u r et h ei d e at h a tc o n s u m e r sw i s ht oc o n s u m ea l l
the goods available in the economy.
Set ai ≡ αi/βi, bi ≡ 1/(βi − γi) and ci ≡ γi/[βi(βi − γi)] with bi >c i.I ti st h e ne a s yt os e e
that the individual demand qir for a good i-variety in city r is given by
q1r =
µ




























Note that P1 is deﬁned over the entire range of good 1-varieties because the market for good 1
is integrated, whereas P2r is deﬁned only over the range of good 2-varieties produced in city r
because this good is non-tradeable. Although our demand system involves no income eﬀect,
it displays a rich pattern of substitution via the relative number of varieties. Speciﬁcally,
when the number of good i-varieties available in city r increases, the individual demand
for any variety of this good is shifted downward. Simultaneously, the individual demands
for good j-varieties are shifted upward because good j becomes relatively more attractive.
Therefore, the size and distribution of the service sector (N2r)a ﬀects individual demands
for the manufactured good in each city. Therefore, even though the cost of trading the
4Alternately, land could be owned by the whole population. If individuals view the well-being of the
retirees as a global public good, ﬁnancing pensions by means of the aggregate land rent looks like a Henry
George rule.
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manufactured good is zero, the ﬁrms producing this good beneﬁt from the agglomeration of
services. Likewise, the size of the manufacturing sector (N1) aﬀects the individual demand for
services in each city and, therefore, the distribution of this sector. However, the distribution
of manufacturing ﬁrms has no direct impact on individual demands because trading their
output is costless. Therefore, one would expect manufacturing ﬁr m st ob ei n d i ﬀerent between
locations. One must keep in mind, however, that manufacturing workers are also attracted
by places supplying a large array of non-tradeable services. This is the linkage that may keep
retirees and manufacturing workers together.
Let Q1(p1) ≡ q1H(p1)LH + q1F(p1)LF be the total demand for a good 1-variety and Π1r ≡
p1Q1(p1) − φ1w1r the proﬁts made by a manufacturing ﬁrm established in city r. Hence,
manufacturing ﬁrms’ proﬁts depend on the distribution of the elderly as well as on the











where Nr = N1 + N2r is the total number of varieties available in city r = H,F and w1r the
wage a manufacturing ﬁrm pays to its workers. Each ﬁrm being negligible to the market, it
treats the price index P1 and the wage w1r as parameters when choosing its own price. It is






which is the same in both cities. Free entry and exit imply that proﬁts are zero in equilibrium,









which is a linear and increasing function of L.
Last, the proﬁts made by a service ﬁrm set up in city r are given by
Π2r = p2rq2r(p2r)Lr − φ2w2r
where p2r is the price quoted by a service ﬁrm located in r and w2r the wage a service
ﬁrm pays to its workers. Each service ﬁrm treats the price index P2r and the wage w2r as








which is the same in both cities.5 This implies that the equilibrium wage paid by service








5Note that our model does not capture the pro-competitive eﬀects generated by the agglomeration of
ﬁrms. Substitution eﬀects go through the number of available varieties instead of prices.
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which is also a linear function of L.
Consequently, once workers have made their residential and occupational decisions and elderly
are located, there exists a unique short-run equilibrium. Furthermore, the equilibrium prices
a n dw a g e sa r ec o n t i n u o u sw i t hr e s p e c tt ot h es h a r e s( sir,σr). This shows that the pattern of
interaction between the two types of population, the two sectors and the two cities is fairly
involved.
3 Aging population and the urban system
In this section, we focus on the occupational and residential choices of workers when the
distribution of elderly people is ﬁxed. Let
Si =




be the consumer surplus generated by any good i-variety at the equilibrium market price p∗
i.
Note that the consumer surplus N1S1 is the same regardless of the city in which consumers
live because all good 1-varieties are available everywhere at the same price. So it does not
p l a ya n yr o l ei nw o r k e r s ’d e c i s i o nt om i g r a t e .T h i si sn o tt h ec a s ef o rt h ec o n s u m e rs u r p l u s
generated by good 2 because N2rS2 changes with the supply of varieties in city r. However,
for each available variety of good 2,t h es u r p l u sS2 does not vary with the city. To highlight
our main results, we make the following normalizations : a1 = a2, b1 = b2 and c1 = c2 so that
p∗
1 = p∗
2. Without loss generality, we then set S1 = S2 =1 . These assumptions do not aﬀect
qualitatively the properties of the spatial equilibria but simpliﬁe st h ea l g e b r a .N o t et h a tt h e
ﬁxed requirements φ1 and φ2 are not supposed to be equal.
The welfare of an individual working in sector i =1 ,2 and living in city r = H,F is given
by her indirect utility Vir evaluated at the equilibrium prices and wages : Vir = N1 + N2r +
w∗
ir(sir) − tLr/2 or, equivalently,
Vir =








sr(1 − θ)L + σrθL
2
. (8)
Hence, the welfare level of an individual depends on the spatial and sectoral distribution of
workers as well as on the intercity distribution of elderly, thus showing the interdependence
between job locations and the residential/occupational choices made by workers and retirees.
3.1 The long-run equilibrium : some preliminary results
A long-run equilibrium arises when no worker has an incentive to change place and/or to
switch job. Formally, this means that V exists such that
Vir = V if s
∗
ir > 0
Vir ≤ V if s
∗
ir =0 . (9)
Note that Proposition 1 of Ginsburgh et al. (1985) implies that such an equilibrium always
exists.
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However, we do not know whether this equilibrium is unique, thus leading us to focus upon
stable equilibria only. The stability of an equilibrium is determined with respect to the













In words, workers out-migrate (resp., in-migrate) from sector i in region r when their utility
Vir is lower (resp., higher) than the intersectional and interregional average utility. This
implies that a change in the population of industry i-workers in one city is not necessarily
accompanied by an identical change in the number of ﬁrms belonging to that industry. Note
also that any long-run equilibrium is a steady-state of (10), i.e., when Vir is equal to the
average utility for i =1 ,2 and r = H,F,w h e r e a ssir =0when working in sector i and city
r yields a utility level lower than the average utility.
Consider an interior long-run equilibrium : s∗
ir > 0 for i =1 ,2 and r = H,F. The mobility
of workers across sectors within each city ensures that all workers earn the same wage within
ac i t y( w∗
1r = w∗
2r). Because the manufacturing ﬁrms set the same price regardless of their
customers’ location, they make the same operating proﬁts in both cities, implying that they
pay the same wage w∗
1 to all their workers. Consequently, factor price equalization holds
at an interior long-run equilibrium. As a result, when the distribution of workers between
cities is uneven, the corresponding urban cost diﬀerential (the last term in (8)) is exactly
compensated by the diﬀerence in the number of non-tradeable varieties supplied in each city
(the ﬁrst term in (8)). In other words, w o r k e r sc h o o s et ol i v ei nal a r g ec i t yw h e r et h e yb e a r
h i g h e ru r b a nc o s t sb e c a u s et h e yh a v ea c c e s st oal a r g e ra r r a yo fl o c a ls e r v i c e s .
Furthermore, expression (7) has a major implication : the service sector is never agglomerated
in a single city r. Otherwise, the equilibrium wage in city s 6= r would become arbitrarily large
since LF ≥ σsθL > 0. This is due to the fact that the individual demand for services becomes
arbitrarily large when N2s → 0. When the manufacturing sector is not agglomerated in one
c i t y ,i tm u s tb et h a tw∗
1 = w∗


















Consequently, we have :
Lemma 1 At any interior long-run equilibrium, the labor force is equally split between the
two sectors.
In order to reduce the number of cases to be investigated, we mainly focus on the relevant
case in which the manufacturing sector is not fully agglomerated.
3.2 The pure eﬀect of an aging population
In order to uncover the pure impact of an aging population on the urban structure of the
economy, we consider the case in which the elderly are equally distributed between the two
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cities (σr =1 /2).6
Solving (9) shows that there exist two candidate interior long-run equilibria (up to a permu-





























































Consequently, the total number of good i-varieties is given by Ni =( 1− θ)L/2φi,w h i c h
decreases with the share of elderly in the economy. Note also that, in both equilibria, the
total population does not aﬀect the spatial distribution of jobs.7
The symmetric pattern (12), which involves two cities having the same size and the same
industrial structure, is a long-run equilibrium whatever the value of the commuting cost t.
On the other hand, the asymmetric conﬁguration (13) is a long-run equilibrium if and only if
∆ > 0 and 0 <s ∗
1r < 1/2 (remember that local services are never fully agglomerated). First,
it is readily veriﬁed that ∆ > 0 if and only if θ<θ where





with θ>0 if and only if t<φ 1/2φ
2
2 +1 /φ2. In other words, for a large city and a small
city to coexist, commuting costs must be suﬃciently low. This should not come as a surprise.
Indeed, when commuting costs take on large values, urban costs in the large city are too high
for all workers to stay put. It remains to determine when 0 <s ∗
1r < 1/2 for the asymmetric
conﬁguration to be an interior equilibrium.
It is readily veriﬁed that s∗
1r <s ∗
2H < 1/2 holds when t>1/φ2,s ot h a tt h ea s y m m e t r i c
conﬁguration is always an interior equilibrium if and only if t>1/φ2 and θ<θ.O n c e
t<1/φ2, s∗
1H < 1/2 (or s∗




2/(2 − tφ2)2 or, equivalently, θ>θ
where






2 +( 1− tφ2)(φ1 +2 φ2)
.
It is straightforward to check that θ =1at t =0 , θ =0at t =1 /φ2,a n dd θ/dt<0
for 0 <t<1/φ2. Consequently, when t<1/φ2, the asymmetric interior conﬁguration is a




2/(2 − tφ2)2 or, equivalently, θ <θ<θ.
We show in appendix that this equilibrium is stable whenever it exists, while the symmetric
equilibrium ceases to be stable in this interval.
6This is reminiscent of Krugman’s (1991) core-periphery model in which farmers are immobile and evenly
distributed between two regions.
7When θ =0 , (13) is identical to the asymmtric equilibrium obtained by Tabuchi and Thisse (2006).
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Accordingly, when commuting costs are suﬃciently large for θ<θto hold, the economy
involves full dispersion (s∗
ir =1 /4). On the other hand, when commuting costs take inter-
mediate values, implying θ<θ,c i t yH,s a y ,h o s t sm o r ew o r k e r st h a nc i t yF. Indeed, it is
readily veriﬁed that s∗
H > 1/2 >s ∗
F.N o t et h a tc i t yH also involves more residents since
L∗
H = θ/2+( 1− θ)s∗
H >θ / 2+( 1− θ)s∗
F = L∗
F.














































The diﬀerent domains and the corresponding equilibria are illustrated in Figure 1, while the
main results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Assume that the elderly are immobile and equally distributed between cities.
Then,
(i) if θ<θ, the economy involves a large and a small city;
(ii) if θ ≥ θ, the economy involves two identical cities.
In words, when the number of retirees is suﬃciently low (θ<θ), the space-economy is
asymmetric with one city attracting more than half of the labor force and population. This
is because ﬁrms are able to exploit increasing returns by being partially agglomerated in the
large city. Proposition 2 also enables us to shed light on the evolution of the structure of
cities. In particular, it is easy to see that the economic structure of the large city varies with
the level of commuting costs and the old-age dependency ratio. Indeed, as long as t<2/φ2
holds, the large city supplies a wider array of varieties of each good than the small city, thus
yielding an urban hierarchy that agrees with Christaller’s (1933) central place theory. Note
that this result is the outcome of a fairly involved process of interaction. Supplying a larger
array of services makes the large city more attractive to all workers. In addition, the supply
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of more services shifts upward the demand for the manufactured good in the large city (see
(4)). This yields higher operating proﬁts for manufacturing ﬁrms, another force that fosters
their clustering in the large city. In turn, more manufacturing ﬁrms, hence more workers, in
the large city sparks a larger demand for services. Consequently, as expected, al a r g e re x p o r t
sector boosts urban growth by attracting services. This is only one side of the coin, however.
Indeed, a larger service sector may also lead to the expansion of the export sector and can
serve, therefore, as another engine of urban development. Note also that, when commuting
costs keep decreasing, the size of both sectors within the large city increases,e x a c e r b a t i n g
urban asymmetry.
In contrast, when t>2/φ2 holds (whence φ1 exceeds 2φ2), the larger share of manufacturing
ﬁrms is set up in the small city, while the larger share of services remains in the large city. In
other words, the size advantage supplied by the large city for the manufacturing sector does
not compensate any more manufacturing workers for the higher urban costs they should bear
there. Thus, the urban system involves two specialized cities.
Consider now our new thought experiment, i.e. t h ei m p a c to fi n c r e a s i n gt h es h a r eo fe l d e r l y







































In other words, both sectors get more dispersed when the population gets older.8 This may be
explained as follows. An aging population leads to a smaller number of workers. This reduces
the demand for good 1 in higher proportion in the large city (see (4)). Hence, everything else
being equal, the decrease in the supply of local services is stronger in H than in F, inducing
workers to migrate toward the small city where urban costs are also lower than in the large
city. Furthermore, this contraction makes local services more attractive and shifts downward
the demands for the manufacturing good in city H (see (4)). This yields lower operating
proﬁts for the manufacturing ﬁrms set up in H, thus leading them to pay lower wages to
their workers. This additional force fosters the migration of more workers from H to F.
Last, when the high old-age dependency ratio becomes high enough (so that θ ≥ θ), the
economy involves two identical cities. Indeed, each city being populated by a large number of
retirees, even the partial agglomeration of workers would make the level of urban costs very
high.
Consequently, we may conclude as follows.
Proposition 3 Assume that the elderly are immobile and evenly distributed between cities.
Then, an aging population fosters the spatial dispersion of economic activity.
8This is obvious for the service sector. Regarding the manufacturing sector, we know that λ
∗
1H < 1/4 when
tφ2 < 2,w h i l eλ
∗
1H > 1/4 otherwise. In both cases, the larger share of manufacturing ﬁrms decreases with θ.
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4 Retiree location and urban development
We now suppose that the elderly are free to choose the city in which they want to live,
denoting by σ the endogenous share of elderly in city F. We also assume that city F is
e n d o w e dw i t ha na m e n i t yξ>0, which is valued only by the elderly.9 Both workers and
retirees choose simultaneously their location according to their respective inter-city utility


















is the indirect utility of a retiree living in city r. Note also that the utility diﬀerential V˚
H−V o
F
is a linear function of L. An equilibrium arises at 0 <σ ∗ < 1 when the utility diﬀerential
∆V˚(σ∗) ≡ V˚
H(σ∗) − V˚
F(σ∗)=ξ,o ra tσ∗ =1when ∆V˚(1) ≥ 0. An interior equilibrium
is stable if and only if the slope of the indirect utility diﬀerential ∆V is strictly negative
in a neighborhood of the equilibrium, i.e., d∆V (σ)/dσ<0 at σ∗, whereas an agglomerated
equilibrium is stable whenever it exists.











t(1 − θ)(sF − sH)
θτ
(15)
while ∂∆V˚/∂σ = −τθ is always negative. As expected, the elderly are attracted by cities
endowed with an amenity (the second right-side term in (15)) and a large number of local
services (the third term in (15)). On the other hand, they are repelled by high urban costs
(the fourth term in (15)).
Since the existence of amenities makes the two cities asymmetric, the two mirror equilibria
(13) are replaced by two distinct equilibria. Consequently, there are now three candidate
interior long-run equilibria (when ξ =0 , these candidate equilibria are identical to (12) and
(13), respectively). As in Section 3, there exists a threshold θ such that one equilibrium is
stable when θ>θ, while two equilibria are stable when θ<θ. These two cases are discussed
in the next two sub-sections. The impact of parameters θ and t on the distribution of activities
is discussed in sub-section 4.3.
Before proceeding, the following comment is in order. We will show that the equilibrium















while σ∗ =1otherwise. Hence, all the elderly choose to live in city F when the old-age
dependency ratio is low, the amenity level is high, or both.
9Alternately, ξ can be interpreted as the diﬀerence in amenity endowments, i.e. ξ ≡ ξF − ξH > 0.
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Thus, more elderly choose to live in the city endowed with the amenity advantage than in
the working-city, an eﬀect that rises with the amenity level. A larger share of elderly in the
global economy also increases the number σ∗θL of old people living in city F but reduces
their share in this city. Indeed, when workers’ locations are given, an aging population leads
to higher urban costs in the city hosting the majority of retirees, which triggers their relative
dispersion. Simultaneously, the number of old people residing in city H increases, meaning
that the population of both cities gets older.10
4.1 Low share of elderly people
When the share of the elderly people in the economy is low (θ<θ), there exist two stable
equilibria in which the primate city is either the working-city or the elderly-city.11
The working-city is the primate city. The ﬁrst equilibrium allocation of workers bet-


























































(1 − θ)L(τ − t)
(19)
shows how the elderly’ location choices aﬀect the distribution of activities.
Let θ1 be the unique solution to s∗
1H =1 /2, so that the manufacturing sector is fully agglo-
merated in city H when θ<θ 1. This, together with (17), implies that manufacturing workers
and retirees are completely separated for very small values of θ (θ<min{θa,θ 1}). This is
because city F has both low urban costs and few service ﬁrms. Once the old-age dependency
ratio increases, both the level of urban costs and the number of service ﬁrms in city F rise,
leading some manufacturing workers to move to city F.W h e nθ exceeds θ1,t h ec o n ﬁgura-
tion (18) becomes a stable equilibrium. In this conﬁguration, regardless of the distribution of
retirees, the manufacturing sector is dispersed between the two cities. However, city H hosts
more manufacturing and service ﬁrms than city F because workers’ commuting costs are
lower for the reasons explained in sub-section 3.2. In other words, manufacturing ﬁrms and
retirees are not attracted by the same city, in accordance with current demographic trends of
US cities (Gabriel and Rosenthal, 2004). Since the population of city H exceeds that of city
F (L∗
H >L ∗
F), H is the working-city while F is the elderly-city. In addition, as shown by
(16) and (18), amenity-improving policies in city F, more intense preferences for amenities
among retirees, or both lead to a larger concentration of elderly in the elderly-city and of
jobs in the working-city. This provides a simple rationale for recent empirical evidence that
suggests that retirees and workers, who used to live together, do so less and less in several
developed countries.
10This result agrees with the projections made for French regions (Léon and Godefroy, 2006).
11Plugging the equilibria (18) and (20) into (15) yields (16). The same holds for (21) considered below.
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Let θ2 b et h eu n i q u es o l u t i o nt os∗
1F =1 /2, so that the manufacturing sector is fully agglo-
merated in city F when θ<θ 2 with θ2 <θ 1.T h ec o n ﬁguration (20) is a stable equilibrium
if and only if θ2 <θ<θ. Observe that (20) cannot be obtained by permuting H and F in
( 1 8 ) ,t h u si m p l y i n gt h a t( 2 0 )i sn o tt h em i r r o r - i m a g eo f( 1 8 )o n c e0 <θ<θ.
It is easy to check that city F is now the primate city (L∗
F >L ∗
H). Because of the larger
number of elderly people living in F, this city is specialized in the service sector (s∗
2F >s ∗
2H).
Manufacturing ﬁrms are not indiﬀerent to this new distribution of elderly people because a
larger array of service varieties available in city F makes this city more attractive to their
workers. However, the larger share of old-age people in city F generates higher land rents so
that the city specialized in manufacturing is a priori undetermined. It is readily veriﬁed that
both θ2 and s∗
1F reach their highest values when ξ =0 . Furthermore, increasing the amenity
level in city F makes this city more attractive to the elderly, thus inducing the relocation of
some manufacturing jobs in the working-city where urban costs are lower.12
It is also worth noting that the specialization of the primate city varies with ξ.F i r s t ,i fξ<ξ
with
ξ ≡






2F > 1/4. In words, the elderly-city is more specialized in the manufacturing
sector than in the service sector. The amenity level being low, the diﬀerence in the number of
retirees living in cities H and F is not suﬃciently high to generate a big gap in urban costs.
Thus, manufacturing ﬁrms and retirees are now attracted by the same city.
Second, if ξ <ξ<ξ with
ξ ≡







1F > 1/4. The amenity level being higher, the primate city now hosts
more elderly people (see (16)). As a result, this city is becomes more specialized in services
because the market for these services is larger. Regarding manufacturing ﬁrms, its share s∗
1F
now decreases because of the larger urban costs triggered by the larger share of elderly living
in F. However, s∗
1F still exceeds 1/4 because the gains resulting from a wider range of services
keep oﬀsetting the higher urban costs.
Last, if ξ<ξ ,w eh a v es∗
2F > 1/4 >s ∗
1F. Stated diﬀerently, the amenity level, hence the share
of elderly people, is so high that city H now hosts the higher share of the manufacturing
sector. This is because urban costs in city F are very high. On the other hand, the primate
city still accommodates the larger share of services due to the larger demand that prevails in
this city.
12When ξ is high enough, all retirees reside in the primate city. Consequently, a change in ξ does not aﬀect
anymore the distribution of the manufacturing sector.
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Proposition 4 If the share of the elderly in the economy is low (θ<θ), then there exist two
stable long-run equilibria.
(i) Under (18), the primate city is the city with the smaller share of old people and the larger
share of both sectors.
(ii) Under (20), the primate city is the city with the higher share of old people and the larger
share of local services.
4.2 High share of elderly people































Because city F accommodates more than half of the old population, city H hosts more
manufacturing ﬁrms than city F,t h eg a ps∗
1H − s∗
1F increasing with the share of old people
in the global economy. The number of service ﬁrms being the same in both cities, we may
then conclude that the numbers of elderly and jobs are inversely related. Indeed, having
more elderly in city F yields urban costs that are proportionally higher than in city H,t h u s
inducing manufacturing ﬁrms to set up in this city. Furthermore, city F is specialized in
services (s∗
2F >s ∗
1F), while city H is specialized in manufacturing (s∗
1H >s ∗
2H). Last, an
aging population leads both cities to become more specialized, even though the total level of
activity decreases in each city.
Note, ﬁnally, that both cities have the same population size (L∗
H = L∗
F =1 /2) but diﬀerent
industrial and age structures. The proportion of old people in city F’s population is therefore
higher than in city H.C i t yF is then the elderly-city, while city H is the working-city.
In sum, we have :
Proposition 5 I ft h es h a r eo ft h ee l d e r l yi nt h ee c o n o m yi sh i g h( θ>θ), then the elderly-city
is specialized in local services while the other city is specialized in manufacturing.
4.3 Comparative statics of city structure
In this sub-section, we study the impact of an aging population (θ) and of decreasing workers’















where x = θ and t. This expression tells us that the total impact of a change in x depends
on the sign and magnitude of the ﬁrst right-side term since the sign of the second right-side
term is always unambiguous.
(i) Recall that increasing θ leads to a lower number of workers in the global economy. When
θ>θ, inspecting (21) shows that ds∗
1H/dθ>0. An aging population thus triggers a redis-
tribution of activities that makes city H more specialized in manufacturing. Note that the
spatial distribution of services is unaﬀected (ds∗
2r/dθ =0 ).
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When θ<θ, regardless of the type of equilibrium, the impact of θ on the spatial allocation of
services is the same as in the case of a symmetric distribution of retirees (see sub-section 3.2).
Hence, an aging population induces the dispersion of services. In contrast, an aging population
has an impact on the location of manufacturing ﬁrms that varies with the type of equilibrium.
















1H/∂θ is negative and independent of ξ. Hence, an aging nation leads to the gradual
dispersion of both sectors when the amenity level in city F is not high (ds∗
1H/dθ<0). When
ξ gets higher, the stronger concentration of retirees in city F m a k e su r b a nc o s t si nt h i sc i t y
higher, thus allowing city H to accommodate an increasing share of manufacturing ﬁrms.
On the other hand, under (20), repeating the above argument shows that an aging population
always decreases the share of each sector in the primate city at the beneﬁto ft h es m a l lc i t y .I n
particular, the mobility of the elderly weakens the agglomeration of manufacturing workers
in city F ((∂s∗
1F/∂σ)(dσ∗/dθ) < 0). Consequently, since the growth in the number of elderly
in city F is higher than in city H, urban costs in the former city rise faster than in the latter.
This in turn renders the primate city less attractive.
Summarizing the above discussion, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 6 If θ<θ, then an aging population fosters the gradual agglomeration of
workers when the amenity level in the elderly-city is suﬃciently high; if θ>θ,t h e na na g i n g
population fosters the gradual agglomeration of workers in the working-city.
(ii) We now consider the impact of decreasing workers’ commuting costs. When θ>θ,
inspecting (21) reveals that s∗
1H decreases when t falls, while s∗
2H is constant. Assume now
that θ<θ. Using (18) and (20), it is readily veriﬁed that lowering commuting costs always
favors the gradual agglomeration of service ﬁrms in the city hosting the larger share of
services. As for the manufacturing sector, when the distribution of the elderly population is
ﬁxed, we know that decreasing commuting costs favor the agglomeration of manufacturing
ﬁrms, regardless of the type of equilibrium (see sub-section 3.2). However, when the elderly
are free to choose where to live, the impact of commuting costs varies with the type of
equilibrium that prevails.















1H/∂t is negative and independent of ξ. Hence, the agglomeration process in the
working-city is slowed down by the arrival of retirees. More precisely, the elderly leave city
F in order to enjoy a wider range of services in the working-city. As a growing share of old
people reside in city H, urban costs rise in this city. Therefore, when the primate city is
the city hosting the lower share of elderly, the agglomeration force triggered by decreasing
commuting costs is partially oﬀset by the new dispersion force generated by the relocation
of retirees.
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On the other hand, under (20), repeating the above argument shows that the mobility of
the elderly increases the share of each sector in the primate city ((∂s∗
1F/∂σ)(dσ∗/dt) < 0).
Indeed, since the number of retirees residing in city F decreases, urban costs in this city
decline. Hence, city F attracts more workers.
To summarize,
Proposition 7 If θ<θ, then lowering workers’ commuting costs favors the gradual agglo-
meration of workers in the primate city provided that the amenity level in the elderly-city
i sn o tt o oh i g h ;i fθ>θ, then lowering workers’ commuting costs favors the dispersion of
workers.
4.4 The case of several cities
So far we have conﬁned our analysis to the special case of two cities. It is, therefore, legitimate
to ask what our results become in an urban system involving an arbitrary number of cities.
When the old-age dependency ratio rises, a growing number of retirees can alleviate the
burden of urban costs by getting dispersed in a larger number of amenity-cities while keeping
their consumption of the manufactured good unchanged since shipping this good is costless.
However, these cities would accommodate a relatively small number of local service providers.
Because retirees have a love for variety in non-tradeable services, this has a negative impact
on their welfare. This eﬀect could be oﬀset by a shift of the labor force toward the service
sector. This in turn would reduce the number of varieties produced by the manufacturing
sector, making this sector more attractive to workers who also have a love for variety. As a
result, regardless of the number of cities in the economy, the consumption of non-tradeable
diﬀerentiated services tends to link the elderly and the manufacturing workers, even though
their complete separation may arise for some parameter conﬁgurations. So it seems hard
to say a priori what behavior a multi-city economy will display because of the connections
between the residential and occupational choices made by workers.
Yet, the analysis of the three-city case will allow us to gain some insights about the ro-
bustness of our results. Speciﬁcally, the structure of equilibria obeys, mutatis mutandis, the
same principles as in the two-city case. In particular, workers are equally split between the
manufacturing and service sectors, regardless of the number of cities (see (11)). In addition,
individuals working in the manufacturing sector are still attracted by cities endowed with
a relatively high number of local services, while they are repelled by places hosting a large
share of elderly because of higher urban costs.
Consider three cities H, F and G, where the last two cities are endowed with the same
















When ∆0 ≡ 3φ1(3φ1 +8 φ2) − 24φ1φ
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which are the counterparts of (18) and (20) in the two-city case. At the ﬁrst equilibrium,
city H has the largest share of ﬁrms and remains, therefore, the working-city. It also accom-
modates more than half of the total supply of local services. At the second equilibrium, city
H no longer has the largest share of the manufacturing sector and has less than half of the
services.










































which may be viewed as the counterpart of (21). As in (21), local services are equally split
across cities whereas city H accommodates the largest share of the manufacturing sector.
T h em a i nd i s t i n c t i v ef e a t u r ei st h a tt h es h a r eo f services in the working-city decreases (from
1/4 to 1/6), as argued by Davezies (2008). More generally, the share of local services in the
working-city can be shown to decrease when the number of elderly-cities rises.
In sum, growing urban costs caused by the agglomeration of individuals act as a force pu-
shing toward the separation of manufacturing workers and retirees. However, the existence
of diﬀerentiated and non-tradeable services builds a strong link between these two groups of
consumers, implying that a signiﬁcant share of them will live within the same cities.
5 Back to pre-industrial urban systems?
Our results shed light on the debate as to whether the supremacy of working-cities may be
challenged by an aging population. Using the case where the elderly are immobile and evenly
distributed as a benchmark, we have seen that an aging nation weakens the supremacy of
working-cities. In the limit, the economy is formed by two cities having the same size and
economic structure. In other words, once we control for the mobility of the elderly, an aging
population acts as a strong dispersion force.
When the elderly are free to choose their residence, the amenity-city always attracts the larger
share of retirees. Regarding the evolution of the urban system itself, our analysis shows that
making strong predictions is not easy because the multiplicity of stable long-run equilibria
allows for various scenarios. For example, a strong and rapid rise in the old-age dependency
may turn the elderly-city into the primate city. Yet, it seems possible to tell some plausible
stories. As shown by Figure 2 (from French data, INSEE, year : 2004), larger regions tend
to accommodate lower shares of old people in France, while large cities have lower old-age
dependency ratios than their national economies (OECD, 2006). This fact is captured by
equilibria (18) but not by (20). Furthermore, the values of commuting costs in developed
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economies are low from the historical standpoint (Glaeser and Kahn, 2004). Last, the old-age
dependency ratio, though rising quickly in some countries, has not yet reached very high
values.
Figure 2. Spatial distribution of people aged 20 to 59 and location of older people.
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All of these lead us to believe that the current situation is well approximated by the equi-
librium pattern (18). This means that city H is both the primate and the working-city. As
the old-age dependency ratio rises, the employment share of each sector keeps decreasing in
the working-city, but remains higher than in the elderly-city. In this respect, note that, in
the United States, upstate cities have lost young adults while sun-belt cities have attracted
population (Chen and Rosenthal, 2008). So, if the agglomeration of manufacturing activities
generates additional beneﬁts not taken into account in our model, the global economy will
incur eﬃciency losses. This could explain why the future growth of the old-age dependency
ratio has triggered much concern in France and other countries. However, once θ exceeds the
threshold θ, the economy would be described by the equilibrium pattern (21). The transition
from one equilibrium to the next is continuous and, because the latter equilibrium is unique,
no bifurcation arises. From now on, the working-city starts recouping a growing employment
share, at least in the manufacturing sector. Alternatively, if a new amenity-city is formed,
our analysis shows that the working-city retains its primacy but its inhabitants have access
to a smaller number of services.
Unlike pre-industrial urban systems, working-cities can be expected to maintain their primacy
while manufacturing ﬁrms and rentiers will tend to be separated but, like pre-industrial
systems, the need to consume b2c services should keep the divergence between manufacturing
ﬁrms and rentiers within fairly strict limits. Although we would be the last to claim that our
model provides an exhaustive account of all the factors at work, it is our contention that the
main forces discussed in this paper will play a major role in the evolution of urban systems
in aging developed nations.
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Appendix
(i) Determination of interior equilibria. Since s∗









In addition, at any interior equilibrium, we have





Using (8), we have

























































Note that u(s2H) > 0 when 1/2 >s 2H > 0 and θ>θ,s ot h a ts∗
2H =1 /4 is the unique
solution to δw =0when θ>θ.W h e nθ <θ<θ, s∗
2H can take three values : 1/4, x0 and x00.
Plugging each of these values in δ1 and solving δ1 =0yields the corresponding values of s∗
1H.
(ii) Stability of interior equilibria. The utility diﬀerential for workers belonging to the
service sector is given by








Regardless of 0 <s 1r < 1/2,w eh a v e
lim




δ2 =0 l i m





¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
s2H=1/4
< 0 if and only if θ>θ.
Last, when θ<θ,w eh a v e
dδ2
ds2H
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
s2H={x0,x00}
< 0.
Accordingly, the equilibria (12) and (21) are stable when θ>θ, while (13), (18) and (20) are
the only stable equilibria when θ <θ<θ.
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